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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FINLEY BRIGGS, STRATFORD 
WENDELBOE, R. G. APGOOD, 
R 0 D N E Y BUTTERWORTH, 
RUSSELL LARSEN, JOE OLI-
VER, 'VILLIAMS JAMES, AND 
ORSON D. SPENCER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants_, 
vs. 
LINCOLN HANKS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
\ Case No. 
9898 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action involving the applicability of the 
Statute of Frauds to an oral agreement wherein the 
promisees have fully performed their part of the bar-
gain, and the promissor was to sell certain shares of 
corporate stock to be evidenced by a letter thirteen 
months after acquiring the stock, the stock in question 
having a value or price in excess of fifty dollars. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case reached pretrial on October 18, 1962, at 
which time the pretrial judge entered a Pretrial Order, 
determining the pleadings setting forth the issues for 
trial with noted exceptions. 
Defendant at this pretrial made a motion that 
plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, which set forth an 
oral agreement, be dismissed, for it was unenforceable 
as a matter of law, under the State of Colorado Statute 
of Frauds. 
The pretrial judge denied defendant's motion. 
On ~larch 19, 1963, another District Court Judge 
presiding on the pretrial division, in effect reversed the 
District Court Judge who denied defendant's first mo-
tion for a Summary Judgment by granting a Summary 
Judgment on plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Summary J udg-
ment granted on their Second Cause of Action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
There are eight plaintiffs, namely: Finley Briggs, Strat-
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ford W endelboe, R. G. Apgood, Rodney Butterworth, 
Russell Larsen, Joseph Oliver, William James, and 
Orson D. Spencer. They will be identified by their last 
names when referred to individually and as plaintiffs 
when referred to collectively. 
Defendant, Lincoln Hanks, shall be referred to as 
defendant or Hanks. 
B. THE FACTS 
Life Assurance Company of the West, hereafter 
referred to as the "Company," is a Colorado insurance 
corporation with its principal office located in Denver, 
Colorado. This company obtained its operating capital 
through a public offering of its stock to residents of 
Colorado. 
Defendant, a resident of Salt Lake City, was em-
ployed by the company as a consultant to advise, and 
assist in the public sale of its stock. (R. 351, page 2, 
interrogatory 6.) Hanks was a best efforts underwriter. 
Defendant's duties included the preparation of sales 
presentation material and manuals, preparation of 
material to be used in a direct-mail advertising pro-
gram, furnish the company with copies of various forms, 
compile daily records and sales summaries; and hire 
train and supervise a total sales force to help sell the 
company stock. (R. 351, pages 2 and 3.) 
Defendant had furnished similar services for other 
cmnpanies offering securities to the public, and all plain-
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tiffs, except for W endelboe and James had been work-
ing for defendant in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a public 
stock offering just prior to the company's sale of stock 
in Colorado. (R. 359, Briggs; R. 211, Butterworth; 
R. 86, Oliver; R. 232, Spencer; R. 281, Apgood; R. 
166, Larsen.) 
James was hired by Hanks through an ad in the 
paper. (R. 136.) 
Defendant agreed with all plaintiffs that their 
compensation would be on a commission basis, namely: 
(a) 10% of the cash received for subscription 
contracts for company stock as subscribers 
paid their subscription agreements to be 
paid by the company; and 
(b) 2% bonus of each plaintiff's total sales to 
be paid to each plaintiff by defendant; pro-
vided, each respective plaintiff remained to 
the end of the public sale of stock, until the 
stock sale terminated, or the plaintiffs were 
released, plus some probable stock of the 
company available. 
(R. 363, 406, Briggs; R. 211, 214, Butterworth; 
R. 86, Oliver; R. 332, 333, Spencer; R. 87. Apgood; 
R. 166, Larsen; R. 136, James; R. 253, 'V endelboe.) 
Plaintiffs were requested to sign an employment 
contract with the company after their arrival in Colo-
rado. At least one plaintiff thought that this arrange-
ment was merely a formality and that his real employer 
was Hanks. (R. 370, 382; Briggs.) 
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In support of Briggs' testimony is Butterworth's 
position where he was selling stock in Colorado on 
March 3, 1961, (R. 211.) and didn't sign a contract 
with the company until 1\tlarch 17, 1963. (R. 63.) 
Hanks mentioned to some of the plaintiffs as early 
as January and February, 1961, that he would be able 
to rnake stock of the company available to them (R. 
:Z11, Butterworth; R. 95 (seeR. 86.) Oliver; R. 333, 
Spencer; R. 298, Apgood; R. 166, Larsen.) if they 
would go to Colorado with him and sell the stock of the 
company. 
In fact, the plaintiffs commenced their services as 
stock salesmen for the company under two employment 
contracts as a result of Hanks' recruiting them to sell 
the company's stock in Colorado, to wit: 
(a) A contract whereby the company would pay 
each plaintiff 10<fo cash of the amount re-
ceived from subscription contracts solicited 
by plaintiffs (See R. 63 for company con-
tract. ) ; and 
(b) A contract with Hanks, on an individual 
basis, whereby he would pay each of them 
2 lfo of their total sales ; provided, they re-
mained to the end or termination of the 
company's stock sale. (See R. 65 for a copy 
of the Memorandum of Understanding fur-
nished to plaintiffs by defendant and sub-
scribed to by him.) Hanks further repre-
sented there would be stock in the company 
for plaintiffs' services at some future time. 
It was possible for the stock representations 
by Hanks to be fulfilled when he acquired 
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from the President of the company 10,000 
shares of the company's stock for 35 cents 
per share. (R. 351, page 3, interrogatory 
10.) Hanks obtained the stock by repre-
senting that it was necessary to keep his men 
(plaintiffs) happy. (R. 351, page 8, in-
terrogatory 23, R. 94, 95.), and that de-
fendant had agreed with his men that they 
would receive two thirds ( 2/3) of the 10,-
000 shares he had acquired. (R. 351, page 
8, interrogatory 23.) 
Hanks related to plaintiffs at a sales meeting in 
his apartment in Denver, Colorado, on April 22, 1961, 
(R. 2, 256, 213, 290, 141.) That he would sell to plain-
tiffs 833 shares each for 35 cents per share. (R. 218, 
294, 387.) Defendant further agreed to furnish a letter 
or written memorandum concerning the shares ( R. 
300, 212, 213.) Hanks claimed he could not deliver 
plaintiffs their stock until 13 months after he received 
it because of restrictions on the stock. (R. 217, 320.) ··=-
On March 6, 1962, Apgood and Briggs delivered 
their respective checks for $291.55 each in full payment 
of their respective shares of stock to Hanks who ac-
cepted said checks but never cashed them (R. 319, 
320, 405, 406.) Apgood, Briggs, and Butterworth were 
in fact owed money by defendant from the accumulating 
2% bonus due them in excess of the amount they would 
owe defendant in payment for their respective shares; 
likewise, the other plaintiffs all had substantial amounts 
due them under the 2% bonus agreement ( R. 66.) The 
accumulating 2% bonus funds were earmarked to pay 
for plaintiffs' shares (R. 293.) 
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Defendant had a contract with the company dated 
the 31st day of ~Iay, 1961, wherein the company con-
teinplated the sale of $2,225,000.00 of its stock. De-
fendant's compensation for his services was one per cent 
(1 <t'o) on all stock subscriptions the company received 
and five per cent ( 5%) on all sales made by salesmen 
procured by defendant. (R. 351, page 3, see attached 
contract on page 14.) 
Defendant terminated his services in June, 1961, 
with the company prior to the completion of its public 
offering of stock. (R. 351, page 5, interrogatories 15, 
16, 17 and 18.) Apgood and Briggs returned to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, terminating their stock sales for the 
company on June 30, 1961, (R. 315.) and continued 
to work for defendant on another deal. The remaining 
plaintiffs continued to sell stock for the company, con-
tinuing their sales efforts until the company completed 
or terminated its sales. (R. 233.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
A SUMl\tiARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAIN-
TIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, FOR 
THE ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT WITH-
IN THE STATUTE 0~-, FRAUDS OF THE 
STATE OF COLORADO. 
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Defendant cites Title 59-1-12 of the Colorado Re-
vised Statutes, 1953, which read as follows: 
"VOID AGREEMENTS.-In the follow-
ing cases, every agreement shall be void, unless 
such agreement, or some note of memorandum 
thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the 
party charged therewith: 
( 1) Every agreement that by the terms is 
not to be performed within one year from the 
making thereof. 
( 2) Every special promise to answer for 
the debt, default or miscarriage of another per-
son. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertak-
ing made upon consideration of marriage, ex-
cept mutual promises to marry. 
( 4) Every contract for the sale of any goods, 
chattels or things in action, for the price of fifty 
dollars or more, shall be void unless: 
(a) A note or memorandum of such con-
tract be made in writing, and be subscribed by 
the parties to be charged therewith; or, 
(b) Unless the buyer shall accept and re-
ceive part of such goods, or the evidence of some 
of them, of such things in action; or, 
(c) Unless the buyer, at the time, shall pay 
some part of the purchase money." 
Defendant relies on a strict rule announced in 1920 
by the Supreme Court of Colorado, in Knoff v. Grace, 
76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526. This was an action by tenants 
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Plaintiffs alleged numerous acts of part perforn1ance, 
among which were that the plaintiffs had resigned po-
sitions in reliance of the oral promise, had taken pos-
session, paid rent, and installed fixtures and other 
equipment. The case does not control the oral agree-
ment between the parties, for it involves an interest in 
land. The doctrine of J(noff v. Grace arises out of the 
application of Chapter 59-1-8 of the Colorado Revised 
Statutes, 1953, which reads as follows: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year of any lands shall be void 
unless in writing." 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in not overruling 
J(noff v. Grace broke its force in 1924 with its decision 
in Moore v. Barnard_, 226 P. 134, and followed by In re 
Moschetfs Estate_, 259 P. 515, in 1927. 
A more recent case considered by the Colorado 
Supreme Court is Rupp. v. Hill_, 367 P.2d 746, wherein 
the court in considering an oral agreement between joint 
owners of a ranch granted a new trial because the trial 
court did not determine whether or not there had been 
part performance which took the matter from without 
the Statute of Frauds. The trial court was directed to 
determine whether there was a parol agreement and 
part performance of the parol agreement for the pur-
pose of determining whether the facts showed partial 
performance. The court further stated that the acts 
relied upon should be resolved by the trier of the facts, 
citing Bushner v. Bushner_, 307 P.2d 204. 
11 
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POINT II 
WHERE ANY PROMISE OF A BILATE-
RAL ORAL CONTRACT CAN BE FULLY 
PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR FRO~i 
THE TIME OF THE FORMATION OF THE 
C 0 NT R ACT, THE CONTRACT IS NOT 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Whether or not a contract can or cannot be fully 
performed within one year requires a literal interpreta· 
tion of the facts. The fact that performance within a 
year is highly improbable or not expected by the par-
ties, does not bring a contract within the statute. See 
Restatement of Contracts_, Sections 195, 198, Comment 
b, Zions Service Corporation v. Danielson .. 12 Utah 2d 
369, 366 p .2d 982. 
Plaintiffs could and did complete the sale of the 
public offering within one year. They were hired in 
January, February, and March of 1961, and the com-
pany's public offering terminated about September, 
1961. (R. 109.) Hanks could have delivered the stock 
to plaintiffs which was in his possession but for the 
pretext of security regulations preventing it. (R. 320.) 
Title 59-1-8 of the Colorado Revised Statutes pro-
vides: 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to a bridge the powers of courts of 
equity to compel specific performance of agree-
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The Supreme Court of Colorado has ordered spe·" 
cific performance based on oral agreements when there 
has been part or full performance on one side of the 
contract. 
In Enos v. Anderson~ 40 Colo. 395, 93 P. 475, 
plaintiffs conveyed to defendant real property encum-
bered by a trust deed as a consideration for certain 
olher property and defendant's oral promise to assume 
the notes secured by the trust deed. The notes were not 
due within one year. It was held that the contract was 
completely executed on one side, and was therefore not 
within the Statute of Frauds requiring that agreements 
not to be performed within a year must be in writing. 
The foregoing is indicative of the general rule as 
annotated in 6 A.L.R.2d 1111. 
"Complete performance by one party to an 
oral contract not to be performed within one year 
takes the contract out of the statute of frauds." 
2 Williston on Contracts~ (Rev. Ed. 1963), Sec. 
504, recites the above general rule citing Enos v. An-
derson~ supra. 
Dutton v. Interstate Inv. Corporation~ 119 P.2d 
138, (California, 1941) is very similar to the situation 
at hand, in that, plaintiff, a practical oil geologist, be-
lieved that land owned by the City of Los Angeles 
contained oil-bearing sands. Plaintiff spent much time 
in forming said opinion. Plaintiff went to an oil scout 
whom he had known for years. Plaintiff and the oil 
scout did not have the necessary assets of $100,000 to 
13 
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obtain a lease from the City of Los Angeles. The scout 
took the proposal to obtain a lease to a third party, 
and the third man entered into a "deal" whereby they 
would divide any profits from the transaction equally. 
The lease was made in the third party's name, and plain-
tiff asked the third party for a written contract on seve-
ral occasions; but the third party delayed in producing 
it from time to time. The third party to the transaction 
acknowledged the oil scout's activities, which were pri-
mary in obtaining the lease, but refused to make any 
settlement with plaintiff. The third party defended 
against plaintiff's action on the basis of the Statute of 
Frauds, in that, it could not be performed within a year 
and must be in writing. The court held the full perform-
ance by plaintiff, removed the bar of the Statute citing: 
Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties~ Inc.~ 
9 Cal.2d 58, 81 69 P.2d 155; Hellings v. Wright~ 29 
Cal.App. 649, 656, 156, P. 365; Restatement~ Con-
tracts_, Sec. 198. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFFS HAD 
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACT RELATIYE 
TO THE COMPANY'S STOCK SALE. THIS 
~: 
AGREEMENT INITIALLY ORAL, WAS RE- ~~ 
DUCED TO WRITING AND SIGNED BY ~11 
DEFENDANT, BUT NOT ACCEPTED BY 
PLAINTIFFS AS THEIR TOTAL AGREE- ~l 
MENT. THE STOCK WHICH PLAINTIFFS 
14 
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1\.ltE SEEKING IS PART OF THIS AGREE-
~IENT. 
Defendant, upon hiring each plaintiff, agreed that 
as part of the consideration for selling the company's 
stock, he would personally pay a 2% bonus of each 
plaintiff's sales; provided, each remained to the end of 
the stock offering. In addition, he represented there 
would be some stock of the company available to plain-
tiffs. The reason for defendant entering into such a 
contract is obvious: He received from the company as 
compensation 5% of the amount of plaintiffs' total 
sales, plus an additional 1% on all stock sales. 
Defendant, by acquiring stock from the President 
of the company and then agreeing with plaintiffs in 
April and May of 1961 to sell them a specified amount 
to be delivered at a later date, was merely keeping his 
promise made in January and February, 1961, in Las 
Vegas, Nevada. The promise for stock is not divisible 
from the agreement for the 2% bonus but is part and 
parcel of what defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs for 
their services. Defendant agreed to deliver a letter to 
plaintiffs wherein he would grant to them the right to 
purchase stock at 35 cents per share. This agreement 
alone removes the oral agreement from within the 
Statute of Frauds, for defendant could have delivered 
the letter within one year even though the letter would 
set forth that the subject stock would not be delivered 
for 13 months. Defendant's Memorandum of Under-
standing (R. 65), which he executed, is not subject to 
15 
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the Parol Evidence Rule because plaintiffs, at least not 
all of them, did not execute it, nor did they accept it 
as their agreement. (R. 212.) Hence all the terms of 
the oral agreement should be gone into by oral evidence. 
Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld~ 133 A.2d 829; Spitz v. Brick-
house~ 123 N.E.2d 117. 
The most persuasive evidence sll::eporting plaintiffs' 
claim to stock is the acceptance by Hanks of Apgood's 
and Briggs' checks in full payment of their stock on 
March 6, 1962. (R. 319, Apgood; 405, 406, Briggs.) 
In summary, the full performance by plaintiffs, 
the Memorandum of Understanding executed by de-
fendant, and the acceptance by defendant of checks 
in the exact amounts for the exact number of shares 
which Briggs and Apgood would be entitled to purchase 
under the alleged oral agreement, all support and prove 
a definite oral contract which is not within the Statute 
of Frauds. 
POINT IV 
COLORADO LAW IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY 
CONTROLLING, F 0 R PLAINTIFFS EN-
TERED THEIR CONTRACT WITH DE-
FENDANT IN NEVADA AND UTAH, AL-
THOUGH THEY PERFORMED THEIR 
SERVICES IN COLORADO. 
The place of performance for the respective par-
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tiffs were to perform in Colorado and did, (R. 63.) 
but defendant could have performed in either Colorado 
or Utah. In fact defendant did the following in Salt 
Lake City, Utah: 
1. Maintain an office. 
2. Paid Briggs money due. 
3. Accepted payment for stock from Apgood 
and Briggs. 
4. Hired Briggs, Larsen, Apgood, Wendel-
boe, and James. 
The following Utah cases on the application of the 
Statute of Frauds should be considered: 
Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold 
Mining Co.~ 134 P.2d 1094. 
Dean v. Davis~ 166 P.2d 15 
Kinser v. Bennett~ 186 P.2d 281 
Dutton v. Interstate Investment Corporation~ 119 
P.2d 138 
POINTV 
PLAINTIFFS ARE TI-IIRD-PARTY BENE-
FICIARIES TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
DEFENDANT AND QUENTIN A. STEW ART, 
PRESIDENT OF LIFE OF THE WEST, AND 
ARE ENTITLED TO E N F 0 R C E SAID 
AGREEMENT FOR THEIR BENEFIT. 
17 
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Plaintiffs plead in the fourth paragraph of their 
Second Cause of Action that they were third-party 
beneficiaries to the contract between Hanks and Stew-
art and that said contract between the aforesaid per-
sons was for their benefit. 
The record is uncontradicted in this matter, that 
Hanks obtained from Stewart stock upon the repre-
sentations that it was necessary for Hanks to acquire 
said stock to deliver to his salesmen; otherwise, they 
would quit; for they were not able to make a living 
selling Life of the West stock. (R. 351, page 3, 4, In-
terroagtories 10-15.) 
The law is well settled that third persons may en-
force a promise made for their benefit. In the instant 
case there is supporting consideration in that Hanks 
received an override commission predicated on all sales 
of plaintiffs. 12 Am. Jur., Sec. 277, P. 825. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS EXIST. 
In the case at hand, plaintiffs claim defendant 
promised to give them a letter whereby each plaintiff 
would be entitled to receive 833 shares of stock as above 
set forth. Said letter would be in the nature of an option 
agreement inuring to the benefit of each plaintiff. In 
fact, the record as it now stands, is uncontradicted on 
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this point, and it is difficult to understand how defend-
ant could be entitled to a Summary Judgment. 
In the matter of the estates of William Robert 
Williams~ et at 348 P.2d 683, it is stated: 
"A summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleading, depositions, affidavits, and admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of rna terial 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." 
See also Disabled American Veterans~ Utah State 
Department of Roy H. H endrixon~ et al~ 9 Utah 2d 
152, where it was enunciated: 
"On a motion for summary judgment against 
a defendant, where some of the facts are in dis-
pute, a judgment can properly be rendered 
against a defendant only if, on the undisputed 
facts, the defendant has np valid defense; if then 
any material fact asserted by the plaintiff is 
contradicted by the defendant, the facts as stated 
by the defendant must, on such motion, be taken 
as true." 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have fully performed a service of 
great value and should be entitled to receive the fruits 
of their labor. Defendant's acts were unconscionable: 
He first represented that he would in some manner 
make stock available to plaintiffs when he procured 
their services ; then during the course of the stock sale 
importuned the President of the Company for stock 
under the guise that it was for plaintiffs to keep them 
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at their tasks; then he related his success to plaintiffs 
that he had acquired and would make it available to 
them for the price of 35 cents per share (the value of 
this offer represented a $4,000 profit to each plaintiff; 
the same price he paid for it; while with guile put off 
the delivery of the stock under a legal pretext; all the 
time benefiting from plaintiffs' labors and obviously 
never intending to sell the stock to plaintiffs. Hanks is 
like the fox in Aesop's Fable who caught a bone in 
his throat and when the pain and anguish became un-
bearable, offered a reward to anyone who could remove 
it. Finally a crane appeared who had a long slender 
neck and bill and stuck his head down the fox's throat 
and removed the bone. Upon demanding his reward, 
the crane was advised that he was fortunate to have his 
life for the fox could have bitten off his head when it 
was in his mouth. 
Plaintiffs should not be left with only the cmnmis-
sion the company has paid and the 2% bonus promised 
by defendant. The conduct and representations of 
Hanks cannot go unheeded, and the Statute of Frauds 
should not be the means to perpetrate such a gross fraud 
as its application would do in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney for Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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